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Clinkscales: Administrative Law--The Scope of Judicial Review of Decisions of

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-THE SCOPE OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DECISIONS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES IN SOUTH
CAROLINA*
I. INTRODUCTION

Historically, judicial review of decisions of inferior courts has been
one of the fundamental facets in the structure of our judicial system.
However, such review of administrative agency decisions has not met
with such wide acceptance. The nature and procedure of administrative
law differs significantly from the other judicial processes, which aids in
understanding its aversion to judicial review. Administrative Law, it
has been stated, is not one of the traditionally recognized parts of our
law, such as the criminal law, the common law and equity. It has its
origin in legislation and has grown piecemeal by the enactment,
application, and construction of specific statutes in regard to particular
agencies.' Several factors have combined to make a system of
administrative law essential to the expedient functioning of our society.
The complexity of our modern social, economic, and industrial system;
the inability of the legislature or the courts to perform these functions
directly; the necessity for constant supervision of specialists and
experts; and the experience acquired by such specialists in difficult and
complicated fields have all contributed significantly to the demand for
an efficient, but flexible regulation of certain key industries and
2
services.
The nature of these agencies along with their desired flexibility
constantly creates differences of opinion as to their function in relation
to the function of the courts in the judicial system. At first glance there
is an obvious overlapping of functions between the two systems based
on their similarity of purpose. The problem of judicial review of
decisions of an administrative agency, which is the central problem of
Administrative Law, necessarily brings the judicial processes into
* Carolina Pipeline Co. v. The Public Serv. Comm'n, 178 S.E.2d 669 (S.C. 1971).
1. Hall v. Geiger Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1916).
2. Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 322 U.S. 194 (1947); American
Power & Light Co. v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 329 U.S. 90 (1946); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 58-1 (1962). This statute provides that the Public Service Commission shall have the
authority to regulate all public utilities.
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conflict with the administrative processes and presents vital questions
as to the relative roles of administrative agencies and the courts in our
system of government. 3 It should be noted that the fundamental
features of judicial review of administrative action is that it is a limited
review. The extent of such review is a variable rather than a constant,
and is affected by many factors which cannot be precisely defined.'
In South Carolina, there are generally two requirements for
judicial review of a decision of an administrative agency. First, any
right to appeal an order of a public service commission must be
founded upon constitutional or statutory grounds.' Section 58-124 of
the South Carolina Code authorizes judicial review of orders of
administrative agencies. 6 Second, there must be an exhaustion of
administrative remedies before there can be any judicial review in
South Carolina. 7 This rule invokes a policy of orderly procedure which
favors a preliminary sifting process, particularly with respect to
matters peculiarly within the competence of the administrative
authority, and serves to prevent attempts to swamp the courts by resort
to them in the first instance. 8
Once the right to judicial review of a decision of an administrative
agency has been established, a test must be used to determine the scope
of review. The courts have used a variety of theories to determine this.
One such approach is the "law-fact" 9 theory which states that
operations of law are for the ultimate determination of the court. This
of course leads to differences of opinion as to what is law and fact, and
consequently to the abandonment of this theory. In its place came a
number of theories, one of which was the "substantial evidence rule." 10
This rule provides a standard of review relating to questions concerning
whether the act should have been done? Most jurisdictions, however,
3. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); Stark v. Wichard, 321
U.S. 288 (1944); United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941).
4. United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59 (1956); Witman v. United
States, 348 U.S. 375 (1955).
5. Southern Ry. v. The Public Serv. Comm'n, 195 S.C. 247, 10 S.E.2d 769 (1940).
6. S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-124 (1962). Decisions of the Commission may be
reviewed by the Court of Common Pleas upon questions of both law and fact.
7. Stanley v. Gray, 237 S.C. 237, 116 S.E.2d 843 (1960).
8. Id. at 247, 116 S.E.2d at 848.
9. NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322 (1951); John Kelly Co. v.
Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1946).
10. Federal Communication Comm'n v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349 U.S.
358 (1955).
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have -substi.tuted -atest such as whether the decision ;was within the
."discretionary";powers of the agency, whether it was "unreasonable".
or whether it was "arbitrary"-or capricious."
II.

2

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION V. CAROLINA PIPELINE'1

The respdndent, Caiolina Pipeline Co., was granted a certificaite of
t'convenience and necessity" 3 by the Public Service Commission in
1958 and amended in .1959. The certificate authorized it to provide the
,Georgetown and Myrtle Beach area with natural gas, Subsequently,
the Midland-Ross Company" expressed an interest in locating in the
Georgetown area and indicated that a large supply of natural gas would
be-needed for its operation. Negotiations between Midland-Ross and
-respondent for the provision of gas proved futile and were eventually
cut off. The obvious desire of the City of Georgetown to have Midland
locate there led it to solicit the South Carolina Electric &Gas Company
concerning the possibility of its supplying the needed gas. The Electric
and Gas Company then applied to the Public Service Commission for a
certificate of "convenience and necessity" to supply natural gas to
Georgetown. The Commission revoked respondent's certificate" and
granted the'sarn-e to the Souih Carolina Electric and Gas Company in
N6vemberof 1969.
Respondent subsequently appealed this decision to the Richland
County Court of Common Pleas which reversed it on June 11, 1970.
.This action led to an appeal by the Commission and the South
Carolina. Electric and Gas Company to the South Carolina Supreme
Court. The court reversed the lower court's order saying that, since
respondent could not adequately service Georgetown, it was within the
Commission's power to grant a new certificate.' 7 Inan obvious attempt
I1.2 AM. JUR. 2d Administrative Law § 621 (1962).
12. 178 S.E.2d 669 (S.C. 1971).
13. No public utility supplying gas to the public shall hereafter begin the
construction or operation of any gas utility system, or any extension thereof, without first
obtaining from the Commission a certificate that public convenience and necessity
require or will require such construction or operation. S.C. CODE ANN. (1962). Public
Serv. Comm'n Rules and Regulations,- Vol. 19 at 440.
14. 178 S.E.2d 669 (S.C. 1971).
15. S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-122 (1962). This section provides that: The Commission
may at any time, upon notice and opportunity to the public utility affected to be heard,
rescind, alter or amend any order or decision made by it.
16. 178 S.E.2d 669 (S.C. 1971).
17. Id.
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to avoid the issues concerning judicial review, the court said it was not
necessary to decide this issue, but stated that the respondent's right to
judicial review by the court is not synonymous with substitution of a
court's judgment for that of an administrative agency. 8 The South
Carolina Supreme Court reached the same result on a similar case a
few days later. 9 Although there are many decisions dealing with the
scope of judicial review of administrative decisions, the actions taken
by the court of common pleas and the Supreme Court indicate that the
issue may not be completely settled.
The respondent, Carolina Pipeline, attempted to justify the circuit
judge's substitution of his judgment for that of the Commission by
relying upon certain language contained in the case of Columbia v.
Tatum.20 This case dealt with an action commenced by the City of
Columbia against the Railroad Commission asking the court to review
an order of the Commission allowing the railroad to discontinue service
in Columbia. Citing Ohio Valley Water Company v. Ben Avon
Borough,2' a territorial confiscation case involving a public utility, the
court said that:
In an action to review orders of the Railroad Commission, a court
must exercise independent judgment on questions of both law and
fact, and as to facts must examine the evidence in the records of
the Commission and determine the truth according to the court's
best judgment.2
18. Id.
19. Petroleum Tranps., Inc. v. The Public Serv. Comm'n, Smith's Adv. Sht. No.
19172 (Feb. 18, 1971).
20. 174 S.C. 366, 177 S.E. 541 (1934).
21. 253 U.S. 287 (1920). The Ben Avon decision, immediately after it was handed
down, became the leading case in the area of judicial review of orders of administrative
agencies. Involving confiscation of lands of a public utility in Pennsylvania, it permitted
the court to substitute its judgment for that of the Commission. Although never
overruled, the case has been widely criticized and at most is authority for situations
dealing with the same factual situation.
22. 174 S.C. 366, 177 S.E. 541 (1934). It was alleged by appellant in their brief that
although the circuit court in Tatum did state by way of dictum that Section 58-124 gives
the court power to exercise its independent judgment on questions of both law and fact,
that actually the issue was never before the court. The case arose out of a desire of the
City of Columbia to have certain street car tracks removed, and bus service substituted in
its place. The franchise operator and the Public Service Commission both agreed to this.
Later, however, the Attorney General ruled that the Commission did not have the power
to authorize such substitution, and the Commission reversed its order. Thereafter, the
matter was litigated under the caption Columbia v. Tatum.
In reversing the second order of the Commission, the circuit judge merely found that
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Blease v. Charleston & W.C. Railway Co., 2 relied upon by the
respondent, is also authority for the proposition that a court has the
power to investigate an order of a Commission and substitute its
judgment for that of the Commission. The Blease case also relied upon
the Ben Avon doctrine, and like Ben Avon, it too was a confiscation
case. 2 The Tatum and Blease decisions are weakened considerably by
relying upon the much criticized Ben A von doctrine. Professor Davis,
in his treatise on administrative law, severely criticizes the Ben Avon
doctrine and cites as its basic weakness its assumption that facts upon
which Constitutional rights depend can be found only by the courts.25 A
similar view of the Ben Avon 'doctrine is taken in Amei'ican
Jurisprudence (second) %.here it is stdted that:
It is doubtful how much validity the rule (Ben A von) has in present
day law, and even the doctrine of independent judicial judgment on
fact issues involving Constitutional guaranties is said to have
gradually died. 2

The respondent's position, in relying on .Tatum and Blease, is,
therefore, weakened by the considerable criticism of Ben Avon.
Although judicial review is provided by statute in South Carolina,
it is clear from cases offered by the appellants, and those others to be
cited below, that one seeking to have an order of the Public Service
Commission overturned faces a difficult task. In Atlantic Coast Line v.
The Public Service Commission, 27 a case involving a suit by the
railroad to enjoin and set aside an order of the Commission requiring
the railroad to enlarge certain station platforms, the court said that:
The decisions and orders of Public Service Commissions with
respect to the regulations of public utilities are prima facie or
presumptively valid, reasonable and correct.2 5
the Commission did have authority to authorize the substitution of service. The brief
stated that the court's statement that it had made independent findings of fact in the
record to justify their ruling was merely gratuitous. At no time did it make findings of
fact independent of those made by the Commission. Consequently, the result reached in
Tatum was done without relying on section 58-124, which respondent contends
authorizes the court to make a factual determination, independent of that of the
Commission. Brief for Appellant at 2, 178 S.E.2d 669 (S.C. 1971).
23. 146 S.C. 496, 144 S.E. 233 (1928) (dictum).
24. Id.
25. 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 29.09 (1958).
26. 2 Am!. JUR. 2d Administrative Law § 695 (1962),
27. 226 S.C. 136, 84 S.E.2d 132 (1954).

28. Id. at 141, 84 S.E.2d at 134; State'v. Broad River Power Co., 157 S.C. I, 153
S.E. 537 (1929).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1971

5

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [1971], Art. 7
1971]

COMMENTS

Therefore, anyone seeking to reverse an order of the Commission must
first overcome these presumptions. In the event that these presumptions
are rebutted, the appellant must then face another test to determine the
scope of review. E.L. Long Motor Lines, Inc. v. FullerMotor Lines" is
authority for the further test, usually applied in South Carolina, that an
order of the Commission will not be set aside unless it is shown to be
arbitrary or capricious in the sense that no two reasonable men could
differ. 0 An elaboration of the "arbitrary or capricious" theory was
made in Atlantic Coast Line where it was said that an administrative
agency's power shall not be interfered with by the courts unless such
exercise is of an arbitrary nature having no reasonable relation to the
execution of a lawful purpose.31 This case states further that a court
cannot substitute its judgment for that of a public service commission
upon a question as to which there is room for a difference of intelligent
opinion, and the court will not set aside an order of the Commission
merely upon the conception of the court as to the wisdom or expediency
of the order.32 In summary, it would appear that the mere fact that two
reasonable men differ on an issue does not make it arbitrary.u
While the "arbitrary or capricious" test is the one generally
employed in South Carolina, a more stringent approach was taken by a
court in a 1940 case.34 This case involved an appeal by the Southern
Railway Company of an order of the Public Service Commission
refusing Southern's request for a discontinuance of service. This
decision by way of dictum stated that even where judicial review is
provided by statute, the court does not, strictly speaking, exercise
appellate jurisdiction, since there can be no appeal in the legal sense
from an order of an administrative body.3 Since the language has never
been followed and since it is also contrary to the idea of Section 58-124,
it is probably of little significance.
A still different test was applied in United Merchants and
29. E.L. Long Motor Lines v. The Public Serv. Comm'n, 233 S.C. 67, 103 S.E.2d
762 (1958).
30. Id.
31. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.v. The Public Serv. Comm'n, 226 S.C. 136,84 S.E.2d
132 (1954).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. City of Columbia v. The Public Serv. Comm'n, 242 S.C. 528, 131 S.E.2d 705
(1962).
35. Id.
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Manufacturers'v. South Carolina Electric and Gas" involving an
action for fraud and deceit. It was stated here that decisions of quasijudicial tribunals, acting within their jurisdiction, are impervious to
collateral attack, and that they are open to avoidance by a court only in
a direct attack on the grounds of clear error of laW, fraud or mistake."
The decision stated furtherthat a court only has the right to affirm the
order of a-commission or remand'the case, and emphasized that there Is
no authority for the court's substituting its judgment for that of the
commission." This is probably the clearest answer to the question of
what procedure a court should follow when it disagrees with an order of
the Commission.
'III.

CONCLUSION

It-.would seem-that the interest of the public and the public utilities
would best be served by allowing only limited review by the courts of
orders of the Public Service Commission. The judicial system is not so
structured that it ,could effectively substitute its judgment for that of
experts serving with the Commission. This expertise coupled with
needed flexibility'makes a reldti )elyindependent Commission essntial.
While it is evident, from,the cases, that the scope ofjudicial review
of administrative decisions is fairly limited in South Carolina, there
stIll exists some doubt as to the exact .cope of the Court's function in
this area. This is evident fromthe tower court's decision in Carolina,
Pipeline and The Pejroleum Transportation? v. The Public Service
Commission. 9 Probably the best approach, to relieve,this doubt, would
be action by the legislaturp .to clarify Section 58-124 and affirmative
steps by the South, Carolina Supreme Court to ,clarify the record,
WILLIAM C.? CLINKSCALES Ill

36. 113 F. Supp. 257 (1953).
37. Id.

.38. Id.

..

39. Petroleum Transp., Inc. v. The Public Serv. Comm'n Smith's Adv. ht. No.
19172 (Feb. 18, 1971).
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